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Abstract
In this paper we address the idea of ‘legal but corrupt’ through a discussion of two cases:
abuse scandals in the Irish Catholic Church and the nancial services industry in the wake
of the Global Financial Crisis. We identify two important dynamics that generated the
scandals: that they were driven by strong and stable groups existing within a peculiar kind
of ‘accountability space’ that we describe as ‘monastic’ and that those groups persisted
with tacit or explicit support from the state. ‘Legal but corrupt’ is, we argue, a matter of
insider incomprehension sustained by the ceding of sovereingty over some aspect of social
or economic life.
1 Introduction
In this short paper we address a number of key issues relating to the ‘legal but corrupt’
theme. We pay special regard to two cases: rst the Irish Catholic Church and then, at
greater length, the regulatory dimensions of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We discuss
the question of how ‘legality’ was and is negotiated between the state and the nance ser-
vices industry. Regulation, we argued, allowed for the emergence of a private regime with
a major public role but that was largely autonomous from broader regulatory dynamics.
We then go on to discuss the construction of responsibility within nancial services, from
the point of view of senior ocers’ reections on what ‘went wrong.’ We highlight the
manner in which market dynamics were presumed to hold nancial institutions and their
ocers in their sway. Finally, third, we link these two issues to explain the continuing
pressure to force nancial services regulation to step back and allow self-regulation to
come to the fore again.
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Before we begin, however, it is important to note that we have to take a particular
stance on ‘legal but corrupt’ in this paper. Taking the GFC, for instance, beyond various
kinds of nancial crime at the margins,i and stories of criminal dealing like that involving
Anglo-Irish Bank as outlined below, the managerial actions behind the GCC are dicult to
describe as criminal or illegal in other terms, or at least explicitly as being instances of ei-
ther nancial or ‘quid pro quo’ corruption. The legal protection of bad business judgement
is not at stake in this paper, and nor are the terms of how business judgement is imagined
in and through law.ii We are interested rather in why a disconnect might form, including
in law, between widespread senses of fairness, desert or blameworthiness and the self-
perceptions of elite actors within particular sectors. Our perspective on ‘legal but corrupt’
in this context ought to be read as a perspective on ‘largely legal but resented actions’ and
how such actions are legitimated through law and are also explained and legitimated in
specic managerial contexts.
2 Private Social Actor and the Autonomy of the
Corrupt: Lessons from the Irish Catholic Church
Let us explain these perspectives with reference to the an issue that is seemingly quite
distant from the GFC: the Irish Catholic Church. The Church has been dened by institu-
tional denial, cover-ups, and obstruction regarding child sexual abuse across a long period
in Irish history. Note that we do not in any way seek to draw an equivalence between the
underlying failings in the Irish Catholic Church and the systemic failings that led to the
Global Financial Crisis and its local manifestations. Our aim rather is to explore strong
institutional autonomy, the idea of particular groups being ‘out of touch’ and the idea that
those same groups have in some way conducted themselves in a corrupt manner. We aim
to outline the diculty state regimes, whether through law or other regulatory forms,
have in negotiating a place for strong and cohesive private forces within society, perhaps
in particular when those forces have a signicant social presence and impact.
In July 2011 the Irish Department for Justice, Equality and Law Reform published the
Cloyne Report into the abuse of children by members of the Catholic Clergy in the Diocese
of Cloyne, situated around County Cork at the southern end of Ireland (Investigation into
the Catholic Diocese of Cloyne 2011). The report, addressing conduct within the Diocese
since 1996 when the Irish Bishops Conference published a Framework Document outlin-
ing detailed procedures for dealing with allegations of child sexual abuse involving clergy,
pointed to a failure on the part of senior actors within the Church not only to recognise
the scale or seriousness of child abuse but even to take an interest in the matter at all.
There was a widespread failure in Cloyne as a result to implement the Church’s own pro-
cedures governing abuse (Investigation into the Catholic Diocese of Cloyne 2011, 1.15).
The report also pointed to the intervention of central Church authorities in the Vatican
aimed at undermining the framework document, an intervention that, the report noted
“eectively gave individual Irish bishops the freedom to ignore the procedures which they
had agreed and gave comfort and support to those who . . . dissented from the stated o-
cial Irish Church policy” (Investigation into the Catholic Diocese of Cloyne 2011, p. 1.18).
At the heart of this failure was the Church’s policy of mandatory reporting of allegations
of child sexual abuse to the relevant civil authorities, a matter that the Vatican had stated
in communication to the Irish Church “gives rise to serious reservations of both a moral
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and a canonical nature” (Investigation into the Catholic Diocese of Cloyne 2011, p. 1.18).
The institutional imperative, it seemed was that of preserving Church autonomy and its
separation and independence from state oversight, regulation and law.
Responding to the Report’s publication in a speech toDáil Éireann (the Irish Parliament),
Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Enda Kenny said:
Cardinal Josef Ratzinger said: ‘Standards of conduct appropriate to civil soci-
ety or the workings of a democracy cannot be purely and simply applied to
the Church.’ As the Holy See prepares its considered response to the Cloyne
Report, as Taoiseach, I am making it absolutely clear, that when it comes to
the protection of the children of this State, the standards of conduct which
the Church deems appropriate to itself, cannot and will not, be applied to the
workings of democracy and civil society in this republic. Not purely, or simply
or otherwise.
He also said that
[T]his is not Rome. Nor is it industrial school or Magdalene Ireland, where
the swish of a soutane, smothered conscience and humanity and the swing
of a thurible ruled the Irish Catholic world. This is the Republic of Ireland in
2011. It is a republic of laws, rights and responsibilities and proper civic order
where the delinquency and arrogance of a particular version of a particular
kind of morality will no longer be tolerated or ignored (Kenny 2011; the second
passage is quoted in McAlinden 2013).
TheCloyne report came at a pointwhere knowledge of historical child abusewaswidespread
and had been for close on two decades. The shock of Cloyne was in its outlining bureau-
cratic resistance to culpability, to state authority and ultimately to reform. The report
acted not only as an exemplar in exposing the intimacy of symbiotic church-state rela-
tions in recent Irish history but also, as McAlinden has it, “the tendency for Church and
State ‘communities’ to deny or minimise wrongdoing, and the stark contrast between their
‘imagined selves’ and the legacy of an abusive past” (McAlinden 2013, p. 192; drawing on
Anderson 1983; Cohen 2000).
So why have prosecutions for conspiracy been absent in the wake of the abuse scan-
dals? Why, especially, when evidence of long-standing conspiracies not to report criminal
acts to the state’s authorities is widespread and persuasive? In the context of this paper
we suggest two reasons: rst that the state was implicated in the long series of cover-ups
and often actively supported Church leaders in covering up crimes. This could easily be
seen as tacit (or explicit at times) state permission for the Church to maintain its auton-
omy and sovereignty, for instance through collusion between the Gardaí (the Irish police)
and bishops (Holohan 2011, 153). This enabled the Church’s senior ocers to choose
how abusers would be regulated (often by moving them on to other parishes where they
continued to abuse). A second reason is that the state responded to the crisis by negotiat-
ing a settlement with the church – by opting for stability over confrontation – where the
taxpayer footed most of the bill for compensation for victims (see McDonald 2006).
While in many ways this was an appropriate response – the state’s failure to protect its
citizens was at the heart of the scandal – it also served to insulate those at the pinnacle of
the Church from the profound self-examination that might otherwise have been necessary.
This insulation allowed the church to maintain its self-conception as an essentially private
and sovereign moral community within the broader community, answering to its own
rules and lines of authority that were explained by strongly enforced special ‘associative’
norms (henceforth, followingDworkin 1986, we employ the term ‘associative obligations’).
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These obligations shaped Bishops’ outlooks on how they ought to interact with state
investigatory agencies. This was articulated by Archbisshop Connell of Dublin, who saw
a direct contradiction between cooperation with police and his associative obligations to
the Church.
In 2002, Archbishop Connell allowed the Gardaí access to archdiocesan les.
The decision to do that, Connell told the Commission of Investigation, ‘cre-
ated the greatest crisis in my position as Archbishop’ because he considered
it conicted with his duty as a bishop, to his priests. When asked why, he
explained:
Was I betraying my consecration oath in rendering the les accessi-
ble to the guards? . . . you’ve got to remember that condentiality is
absolutely essential to the working of the bishop because if people
cannot have condence that he will keep information that they give
him condential, they won’t come to him. And the same is true of
priests (Holohan 2011, p. 120).
Within the connes of this paper, we posit two dynamics from the scandal whose in-
teraction had a determinative eect on the situation. First, the strong internal narra-
tives and associative obligations allowed a peculiar kind of ‘accountability space’
to develop, characterised not solely by the ‘forum,’ to draw on Bovens’s (2007a; 2007b)
metaphor, but by what we might call ‘monastery’ (see Dubnick 2013). We use ‘monastery’
to denote a space characterised by a strong – and strongly enforced – normative vocabu-
lary where internal narratives of virtue and vice, combined with patterns of mutual recog-
nition and social esteem, exist (largely at least) independently of the forms of recognition
and esteem that prevail in the surrounding society. The monastery is managed both as a
unied accountability space and as one that is cut o from the rest of society.
This kind of space is sustained, second, because it is licensed to do so: it persists in the
light of tacit or explicit support from the state. While such support was of course
at the heart of the longevity of actual monasteries (for one insight, see Rost et al. 2010)
its role in the accountability space relates to protecting autonomous spaces both from
scrutiny and from standards of conduct other than those set internally.
3 Associative Obligations and Accountability
Deepening our rst point above, regarding the ‘monastery’ metaphor, the problem of as-
sociative obligations has been an important problem in social and legal philosophy for
a number of years (see for instance Dworkin 1986, 195; Simmons 1996; Atkinson 1995;
Hardimon 1994; Almond 2005; Orsi 2008). For us here suce to say that of the kinds of
duties that attach to roles reveals one important trait in modernity: the very strength with
which associative obligations are brought to bear on organisational life. A moral com-
munity’s secession from the “general framework of [reactive] attitudes” (Strawson 1974,
p. 25), can lead to mutual incomprehension between insiders and outsiders regarding the
moral signicance of actions to the decline of the patterns of moral recognition that are
required for a general web of second-personal standpoints (Darwall 2006) to be sustained
across society. A kind of enforced ‘bounded’ moral rationality can emerge.
In the case of scandals surrounding the Irish Catholic Church, such obligations were ar-
ticulated through employment of the idea of the Church’s sovereignty under Canon Law.
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Wemight imagine special obligations forming in less obviously hierarchical ‘thick’ circum-
stances (on ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ see Dubnick and O’Kelly 2005; O’Kelly and Dubnick 2006).
Importantly, internal organisational power is brought to bear on its subjects through the
organisation’s capacity to arrange patterns of condemnation and approbation, sanctions
and rewards and promotion and demotion. The exercise of power through various ‘forums’
(see Bovens 1998; Bovens 2007a; Bovens 2007b; Schillemans and Bovens 2011; Schillemans
and Busuioc 2014) can inuence the terms of more ‘ground-level’ accountability relation-
ships as people seek to contend with the multiple, diverse and often conicting expec-
tations under which they live their lives (Dubnick 2014). While the consequence of that
inuence are dicult to predict, and while the power of the forum itself depends on the
other relational spaces that form, the accountability spaces of rms, churches and other
hierarchical organisations are themselves a kind of Coasian eciency (Coase 1937). The
desires and intentions of senior ocers, that is, are communicated and enforced through
the encouragement of particular patterns of conduct, the exclusion of other possible pat-
terns of conduct and the excision of dissenters from the ranks.
The challenge such ‘quasi-private but socially-public’ regimes present for the public
sphere is immense. Regulatory and policing regimes nd it very dicult to access closed
information systems and so transparency – conventionally held to be the core ingredient
for accountability – becomes far more dicult. Internal cohesion, enforced through the
promotion of common mentalities suggests that whistleblowers and more ocial sources
of information are few and far between and face signicant penalties when they step out
of line. And so in short, the special obligations are a key component of the breakdown in
the kinds of special moral measures and vocabularies that help explain situations where
corruption identied from the outside are seen as loyalty, or stability, or even virtuous
social service from the inside. This, rather than outright ineptitude might go to the heart
– not of the terrible actions of abusers – but to the apparent confusion and even anger of
Church leaders to popular rejections of their conspiracies to deal with abuse on their own
partisan terms.
4 Global Financial Services Firms
While this problem has set in stark relief with regards to Ireland’s Catholic Church, as out-
lined above, it is also apparent with the global, highly complex and opaque rms that have
come to dominate industrial economies. Our second, more detailed, case focuses on the
banking sector as it has emerged through the GFC, in large part to highlight similar lessons
to those learned with regard to the Irish Catholic Church above. That is, that banking has
emerged as an autonomous normative space – we are loosely tracking Polanyi’s argu-
ments about the ‘disembedding’ of market from society here (see Polanyi 1944; Picciotto
2011a) – with, in this case, both tacit and explicit support from the state. Our argument,
beyond that, is that social narratives of corruption have little traction internally within
such ‘monastic’ spaces and that law, in the light of state support, has few if any bases
upon which to negotiate its entry into such spaces.
Following on from our second point above – that ‘monastic’ accountability are sustained
because they are licensed to do so – we ought to recall that law is not a single predictable
and knowable force. We should think of it instead as “a welter of conicting principles,
imperfect analogies, and ambiguous generalities” (Suchman and Edelman 1996, p. 932) that
is negotiated between legislators and regulators and law’s regulatory targets and subjects.
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Law is, as such, always bounded by the terms of acceptability upon which law-makers
and organisational insiders can agree. This is one reason why the ‘monastic’ accountabil-
ity space can be so stable and long-lasting: it provides a strong and unwavering public
narrative that is often both impermeable to broader narratives (or popular outrage) and si-
multaneously is persuasive to elite public actors who are amenable to the power of strong
private actors.
To put this dierently: we need to be wary of imagining law as simply acting upon
passive subject and from there to thinking of regulatory failure as resulting at a basic level
from some witting or unwitting lacuna in the law that is then subject to exploitation. Law
and regulation is fundamentally shaped by the negotiation of terms public and private
actors. That is a crucial part of what law is.
As such, we need to remember that both the concepts corruption and of law are imag-
ined in the light of monastic – as we call them – private actors wielding power across
society at large. Resentment of the apparently corrupt (going back to Strawson 1974), is
not a simple matter because the self-contained moral communities that we describe here
simply see their conduct as virtuous and socially benecial:
‘Is it possible to have too much ambition? Is it possible to be too successful?’
Blankfein shoots back. ‘I don’t want people in this rm to think that they have
accomplished as much for themselves as they can and go on vacation. As the
guardian of the interests of the shareholders and, by the way, for the purposes
of society, I’d like them to continue to do what they are doing. I don’t want
to put a cap on their ambition. It’s hard for me to argue for a cap on their
compensation.’
So, it’s business as usual, then, regardless of whether it makes most people
howl at the moon with rage? Goldman Sachs, this pillar of the free market,
breeder of super-citizens, object of envy and awewill go on raking it in, getting
richer than God? An impish grin spreads across Blankfein’s face. Call him a
fat cat who mocks the public. Call him wicked. Call him what you will. He is,
he says, just a banker ‘doing God’s work’ (Arlidge 2009).
This kind of perception helps explain the fact that the crisis seemed to lack a broader
educative tone for banking: those who remained in business had their skills conrmed
and those who did not were able to look to systems and circumstances for blame.
Banking is already characterised by the use of legal forms – corporate personality and
limited liability for instance – to manufacture highly complex value chains (see for in-
stance Neilson, Pritchard, and Yeung 2014, and other essays in the same special issue)
and corporate groups (see Dine 2000; Picciotto 2011b), often as much in pursuit of tax
and other kinds of arbitrage as they are in pursuit of production eciencies (see Hadden
2012). Driven at least in part by the well-documented correlation between rm size and
executive pay (see Girma, Thompson, and Wright 2007; Bliss and Rosen 2001; Cosh 1975),
and in part by the advantages for liability inherent in structures that were too complex to
govern, senior ocers in banks participated not only in a headlong push for risk, but also
in the use of rewards and incentives to communicate and enforce norms throughout the
sector. The educative eect of bonuses and gaps between banking and non-banking pay
in regional economiesiii – in London for instance – is likely to be signicant both in terms
of its positive eects on performance and in terms of its imposing the discipline of ‘golden
handcus’ on workers who are tempted to dissent from ‘monastic’ norms.
The growing dominance of nancial services has been matched at state level by the per-
ception that nancial services existed in a self-contained and self-regulating market, that
rm complexity was best managed internally and that shareholder discipline restrained
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any self-serving impulses on managers’ parts.iv What is really interesting, however, is
how the GFC, when it came, did so little to disrupt such narratives.
One reason for thismight be that thosewhowere exposed to public opprobrium and cen-
sure could fall back on systemic circumstances to explain their institutions’ failures. Here,
for instance, is David Drumm, ex-CEO of Anglo-Irish Bank (reputed to be the ‘world’s
worst bank’). Drumm explained the bank’s failure by saying that “everybody believed
that we were in a unique situation in Ireland. We had a great economy, we had tremen-
dous fundamentals that would see us through and therefore life was good and we would
continue to grow over time.” (O’Dowd and Muldoon 2011) Similarly, for Fred Goodwin,
ex-CEO of the Royal Bank of Scotland,
As you can imagine, I have gone over this time and time and time again in my
own mind as to what was the point at which we should have seen this dier-
ently, and I keep coming back to at the time there was a view, not that things
would continue forever, there was a denite mood that the economy in this
country and generally was going to slow down, that nancial markets were
going to slow down; but at no point did anyone get the scale or the speed at
which. That is really what has been so damaging about this slowdown. It was
not that our business was premised on everything continuing to go upwards
forever; but that things could turn as quickly as they did, I do not think anyone
saw (Oral Evidence to the Treasury Select Committee 2009, Q1645)v.
The line of Drumm and a number of others (see below) encapsulated a style of ‘agent
regret’ where the line from actor to action is dened by ‘moral luck’ (Williams 1981; Zim-
merman 1987). Action is held to be regretful but the actor does not ‘own’ it, morally
speaking, because they were either acting within set roles – and so responsibility was di-
luted or absent (on which see Wolgast 1992) – or actions were harmful only in the light
of external events.vi Drumm’s defence above draws on the second of the two: that harm
came through (market) forces beyond his control. He excused himself by explaining that
the bank’s collapse was preceded by a consensus between Anglo executives, regulators
and ministers over how to proceed and, as such, that he cannot stand out as a responsible
party: he cannot take individual responsibility for collective actions (for one discussion of
such matters, see Silver 2006).
There is no reason to doubt either Drumm’s or Goodwin’s sincerity in their excusing
their behaviour, even if they had tended to self-praise when times were good (ably assisted
by scholars at times. See Nohria and Weber 2003). What is interesting, however, is how
such narratives helped to avoid disrupting the internal cohesion of banking’s accountabil-
ity spaces: by simply blaming circumstance, or even bad business judgement in the light
of circumstance, countless problems in organisational form, corporate governance, state
collaboration and the like were put aside.
This in turnmight explain the willingness of the remaining population of senior bankers
to respond to the crisis, if not in Blankfein’s forthright tone, then in tone’s that suggest a
tin ear for public opinion (although no set of ears were so ill-tuned as that of Anglo-Irish
Bank executives who were revealed in leaked tapes to have laughed and joked as they
sought to deceive the Irish state as to the extent of their losses in an eort to lure the
state into rescuing the bank (see Lyons and Sheridan 2013; on Anglo-Irish Bank’s collapse,
see Carswell 2011)). So, for instance, less than two weeks after HSBC was ned for its
role in money laundering activities, its Chair stated that “there was ‘an observable and
growing danger of disproportionate risk aversion creeping into decision-making in our
businesses as individuals, facing uncertainty as to what may be criticised with hindsight
and perceiving a zero tolerance of error, seek to protect themselves and the rm from fu-
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ture censure”’ (quoted in Arnold 2014). Or, earlier on in the crisis, Deutsche Bank CEO
Josef Ackerman spoke out, telling an audience at Davos that “an ongoing ‘blame game’
and uncertainty over future regulatory changes threaten to weaken the nancial sector,
potentially inhibiting a recovery” (Watts 2010). Again, we ought not to take such state-
ments as simply strategic. We ought to see them rather as reecting general sentiments
within the monastic communities that banking makes up. An apparent tin ear might well
be nely tuned to the voices it can hear.
When it came to the state’s role in the crisis, the British state has been proactive in
self-examination with regard to its regulatory role. As a consequence we do get a sense
of how little capacity for action there was in the Financial Services Authority especially
(see for instance FSA 2011), because the regulators themselves had abandoned the space
to the insiders. In Ireland the situation was, if anything, even worse, with senior nan-
cial regulators both reluctant to regulate for fear of undermining Ireland’s ‘competitive’
climate and even participating in roadshows helping to drum up business for the nancial
services sector (see Honohan 2010, para 7.27).
Indeed, when three executives were placed on trial for an illegal loans scheme that had
been designed to boost Anglo-Irish Bank’s shares as it neared collapse, and twowere found
guilty, they were spared a custodial sentence because, as the trial judge put it, “a State
agency had led them into error and illegality” (quoted in Gartland 2014). The impression
was not of a regulator who was colluding in corrupt actions, but of one who had self-
consciously stepped away from regulating on the grounds that powerful insiders simply
ought not to be regulated at all.
5 Conclusion
The close relationships between political and regulatory actors and bank executives in
Ireland and elsewhere is symptomatic of a common perception that the ‘disembedded’
autonomy of the nancial economy is not problematic. This is at its heart the crux of
‘legal but corrupt:’ that law is itself disempowered by its authors and indeed facilitates
conduct that is at odds with the broader ‘moral economy.’ We should also recall that such
conduct is likely not done simply in the face of public opinion – nancial market actors,
as with any others, rarely behave from self-consciously bad faith or motives. Instead they
simply disagree with broader notions regarding the value of what they do or they are
simply unaware of those broader notions – or of their depth.
‘Corrupt’ is as such something of a misnomer: it has very little explanatory power in
this context, as it did with the case of the Irish Catholic Church above. Corruption is at
this level in the eye of the beholder. Isolated moral communities nd it hard to nd terms
through which they can communicate about their conduct with others. This ought to be
law’s role: to negotiate those terms. But when law is not available, for whatever reason,
then such terms are hard to come by.
‘Monastic’ accountability spaces, connected with strong and stable associative com-
munities are particularly hard to access. This is even more the case when they possess
economic or other social power to the degree that they can set ot to neutralise law’s medi-
ating role, in particular through the development of close relations with those in political
power. Corruption in this case happens by license, but that license is not simply granted:
it is part of a long-standing negotiation of sovereignty between a strong private actor and
the authority of the state.
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Notes
iFor instance, see http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml.
iiUK and Irish courts tend to be quite protective of business judgement and ‘duties of care, skill
and diligence’ (Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd 1925; Re D’Jan of London Ltd 1993; see
also Arsalidou 2003; Brennan 2009). The United States represents perhaps a more interesting case,
with prosecutors being more aggressive in prosecution in the wake of business failure, whether
through prosecution related to ‘honest services’ or through various forms of pre-trial diversion. See
for instance Casey 2010; Brickey 2005; O’Brien 2003; O’Brien 2012; Uhlmann 2013.
iiiIn the UK for instance, workers in banking and business services have been the “principal ben-
eciaries of increased inequality” through their access to high wages (Bell and Van Reenen 2014,
F8). In the United States, working in nance carries a 50% premium over working in other sectors,
adjusting for education (Philippon and Reshef 2012).
ivPerhaps it is unsurprising that ideological dynamics at state level paralleled private interests.
Snider (2000), for instance, argues that economic interest is a signicant factor in determining which
theoretical perspectives gain traction.
vOn Goodwin’s reign in the Royal Bank of Scotland, see Martin 2014; Fraser 2014.
viThe classic example of this being the driver who kills a child who stepped out from behind a
parked car. They may feel profound regret at the event and their role in it but they tend not to be
held responsible for it.
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